Psychology is a bifurcated profession whose two domains, typically called the "clinical" and the "experimental" or "scientific," have developed essentially independent codes for ethical conduct. Clinical psychologists have numerous regulations and ethical standards for client treatment and health-care systems. Experimental psychologists, however, primarily have established guidelines for the conduct of research with human participants or animals¹.

This asymmetry in ethical standards initially appears reasonable for it is the clinical contingent that dispenses professional services to the public while the experimental half works in laboratories or other scientific research centers. Those engaged principally in research are supposedly governed by the implicit norms of sound scientific practice and do not require extended principles to guide their conduct.

These dual standards of professional conduct in psychology are questionable on several points. Most notable is the fact that many scientific psychologists do become involved in the practical utilization of psychological knowledge. That is, within the field there is a healthy tradition fostering "the application of research findings to the promotion of public welfare²." The continuation of this tradition is frequently reaffirmed³, and perhaps is most visible in psychologists' participation in the area of policymaking.

A recent study of the use of social science in policymaking by high-level government officials disclosed that psychology was used most frequently of all the social sciences⁴. A survey of psychologists interested in social issues reported that those researchers had influenced policy decisions in education, foreign affairs, environmental problems, crime prevention, drug abuse, civil rights, unemployment, the arms race, energy conservation, child care, mental health, and law enforcement, among others⁵. These examples signify professional involvements that are not addressed in or subsumed by the existing ethical standards for psychological research.

What are the consequences of this lacuna in the ethical standards established for experimental psychology? Cyril Burt's dramatic actions constitute a now well-known example of the misuse of psychological knowledge inside and outside the laboratory. Other cases are neither so clearly illicit nor so notorious. Same possibly controversial cases include the endorsement of the lie detector when only twenty studies, many inadequately designed and conducted, tested the instrument's reliability; the promotion of biofeedback techniques when the existing research failed to meet minimal scientific criteria of efficacy; or an announcement of the detrimental effects of day care that was followed sometime later by a public retraction based on additional research showing the absence of any such detrimental effects⁶.

These examples cannot be adjudicated according to the aforementioned ethical codes yet they inti mate ways in which psychological knowledge can be misused. However, such potential for misuse must be examined in relation not only to documented codes of conduct but also to those more or less implicit rules or norms governing scientific activities.

Guided by the conventional conception of science, the American Psychological Association has devised standards for such conduct⁷. In this and similar statements, it is held that science offers valid knowledge of external reality given that scientists subscribe to empirical evidence, proper methods of inquiry, and logical consistency. From such premises it is assumed that scientific knowledge can be used to improve rational decisions including those of policymaking. It is assumed further that scientists, by virtue of their ethos of disinterestedness, universalism, and organized skepticism, seek knowledge according to these standards.

Hypothetically at least, scientists' professional engagements outside the laboratory can be assessed by the extent to which the norms of scientific practice are followed. Under these conditions misconduct generally consists of fraudulent actions of individual scientists, by disclosure of research that is known to be inconclusive or otherwise erroneous, or by some form of misuse on the part of non-scientists.

From a broader perspective, then, experimental psychology can be seen to function with two sets of codes of professional ethics: one for the conduct of research and one for other activities requiring scientific expertise. Identification of these extended principles of ethical conduct means that they can be employed to assess cases of potential misuse.

This procedure was adopted to examine three purported cases of misuse in psychology: eugenics, mental testing, and behavior modification in the classroom⁸. Two of the cases are historical thus permitting full analysis of the events: the eugenics movement (1900-1930) included numerous psychologists who conducted relevant research, applied their findings, and generally supported those policies for selective human breeding of superior traits; and the widespread promotion of mental tests (1915-1930) to augment such policies as immigration restriction and education involved similar actions on the part of psychologists. The third case has more recent origins: the extension of behavioral science to techniques for modifying disruptive or otherwise undesirable classroom behavior.

These cases were examined for evidence that misuse outside the laboratory would entail the violation of commonly-held norms of scientific practice. Four of these norms were identified and applied. Two concern the handling of research (empirical methods and disinterested reporting) and two concern the application of findings (interpretation of research by nonscientists and public surveillance of such applications). For the most part there was no evidence for the following assumptions.

(1) That misuse involves distortion, fabrication, or other incorrect production of data. Although such practices do occur in science, only one instance was detected in the three cases. It involved the incorrect calculation of averages on intelligence tests. Considering the volume of data and the relatively undeveloped means of calculation, this error is hardly unreasonable.

(2) That misuse arises when scientists, motivated by some interest or political commitment, engage in deceitful practices (lying, misinterpreting results, "cooking" data). The three cases contained no blatant evidence of such activities. As the study did not replicate research or re-analyze data, it leaves open the possibility of deceitful practices. Yet there were some clear examples of scientists' conscientious efforts to prevent these occurrences including the cautious discussion of methodological problems and the public retraction of preliminary findings once they were found to be in error.

(3) That misuse results from the selective utilization of science by nonscientists (such as policy makers or politicians). The three cases revealed no obvious distortion of scientific information by nonscientists. If any selectivity occurred, it appears to have originated outside the nonscientists' domain.

(4) That misuse is or can be terminated once it becomes public knowledge. Although all three cases eventually received visible public admonitions for misusing scientific knowledge, there is evidence that the engagements were not abandoned.

For instance, the eugenics movements receded significantly with the public denunciation of its theoretical bases and its rising popularity in Nazi Germany, yet contemporary genetic research has spurred various eugenic proposals-from genetic screening to purported repositories for the sperm of Nobel laureates. The public criticism of mental tests in the twenties apparently did not seriously deter the continued use of tests to sort individuals according to psychological abilities. And while behavior modification has vocal critics, it remains part of many educational policies.

The similarities found among the cases challenge the conventional notions about the misuse of science far it does not always entail the distortion of "facts" by scientists or the selective use of "neutral" information by nonscientists. Nor can it be presumed that public disclosure prevents or arrests misuse.

Instead the study indicates that misuse is more closely related to certain assumptions about the place of science in society-assumptions that extend beyond the conventional norms for scientific method and evidence. The assumptions are often tacit and frame our thinking about the social function of science and scientists. It is the transgression of these broader and socially-based assumptions that is most relevant to misuse as it was detected in the three cases. Four of these assumptions were particularly salient.

(1) That (psychological) science is without cultural or implicit values. One of the most pervasive themes in the three cases is the professed value neutrality of research. Here psychologists proffered two arguments: that psychology did not prescribe the ultimate goals of society and that decisions made with psychological knowledge were more objective and, hence, preferable to decisions based solely on common sense or political beliefs. Their arguments effectively increased receptivity to the utilization of psychology and apparently decreased concerns about the adequacy of research.

The point is not that the values inherent in mental testing, eugenics, and behavior modification led to distortions or wild extrapolations but that they affected the choice of research problems and variables, the generalization of results to certain policies, and the very images of the ideal individual and society. Thus, eugenics' researchers investigated differences between individuals while ignoring similarities or social psychological concepts such as group cooperation. They preferred the study of intellectual abilities over social, physical, aesthetic, or personality attributes. Mental test researchers concentrated primarily on methods for sorting individuals according to specific intellectual abilities, and they were convinced that such sorting should occur. Tests were designed as expedient means toward order, efficiency and a meritocratic system.

(2) That there usually is consensus about the veracity of psychological knowledge and if there is not, the contending evidence is presented. Many expect that psychologists acting as scientific experts furnish all the known evidence on a particular issue. Where the empirical findings are contradictory, it is assumed that the contending evidence is revealed and evaluated judiciously. In all three cases the evidence given was selective and not representative of the full range of relevant information. The presentation of alternative, contending, or controversial scientific ideas was not a noticeable part of the experts' role.

(3) That the role of psychologists in society, specifically in policy-making, is that of technical or scientific adviser. The cases provided substantial reference to the legitimate function of psychologists as experts or specialists who bring empirical evidence to bear on a particular problem. Yet this narrowly prescribed role of expert varies from the parts actually taken by psychologists. With regard to eugenics, psychologists actively lobbied, contributed to eugenics organizations, and made various other attempts to facilitate eugenics' measures. Mental test researchers volunteered assistance to political causes, economic ventures, and movements to amend educational and mental health policies. In these roles psychologists did not abandon their scientific identity but rather relied upon that persona far credibility.

(4) That citizens have rights to participate in decisions such as those involving the use of scientific knowledge in policy decisions. The democratic right of citizens to participate in government includes direct or indirect participation in policy decisions. The cases indicate that, to some extent, psychologists held that these rights should be waived when science-related issues are confronted and they supported this suggestion with three general claims: that citizens cannot always understand science, that citizens need to be informed about psychology in order that they can accept decisions, not participate in them, and that applying science to policy decisions is for the "good" or "protection" of citizens. These arguments are clearly implied in both eugenics and mental testing research where some psychologists believed that their research findings on the prevalence of low intelligence indicated the inability of many citizens to understand science or make rational decisions about society.

In the three cases, the violation of these tacit assumptions is related to the eventual apprehension of misuse. Although deterred somewhat by scientific advances (such as revised genetic theories) and by contentions of other psychologists, the most pervasive influences on the perception and ultimate demise of the uses of psychological knowledge came from more general changes in social values. More specifically, the uses were contended by social critics and events in society that diminished their desirability. Thus, the sobering aftermath of World War I cast eugenics as a rather unrealistic program for those postwar policies dedicated to urgent economic and social problems. Mental testing lost much of its sensationalism and impetus through social criticism and its apparent value was shadowed by the more urgent remedial policies that were enacted during the depression. Following visible social criticism and court actions, psychologists who continue to promote behavior modification in the classroom make visible efforts to ensure their legal, ethical, and social propriety.

These three examples and others illustrate the inadequacy of ethical principles governing only research and implicitly-held standards of scientific activities. The cases show that the misuse of psychology also may be related to certain broader assumptions about the function of science in society. Relevant in these cases are the role of psychologists, the cultural dimensions of theory, the relation of the knowledge of science to that of social policy, and citizen participation. Detection of misuse may be tied to changes affecting the relevance of scientific ideas to social conditions or the authority of scientists in social affairs.

These conclusions are disturbing to those who advocate the creation of better regulations or guidelines for the professional conduct of scientists. However, some reassurance can be gathered from the recent discussions about science and scientists in society.

First, an increased awareness and revised conceptions of science challenge the conventional views about scientific norms. It has become apparent that science can be utilized in ways that are discordant with human rights and values, that scientists are not always detached from political life (note the contrasting cases of Lysenko and Oppenheimer), and that fact and value are not dichotomous entities with science generating only facts. This thinking has led to various proposals for alternative models for using science, models which presume greater citizen involvement and sensitivity to the relation between scientific knowledge and policy decisions.

Second, many psychologists themselves are acquiring a similar awareness and consequently have prompted much-needed discourse on the epistemological questions of fact and value and the cultural bases of theory as well as on the responsibilities of psychologists involved in policymaking.

Finally, there is a growing recognition that the expectations placed on both scientists and citizens often have been unrealistic. In the past it has been too readily assumed that medical or scientific experts are able to extend their expertise to encompass complex questions of philosophy, law, and ethics. These reconsiderations and discoveries about the function of science and scientists suggest a need for humility from all sides. Perhaps the best realm for manifesting such humility continues to be education-for scientists, citizens, and policymakers.

Footnotes
1. American Psychological Association, Ethical Principles in the Conduct of Research with Human Participants (Washington: American Psychological Association, 1973); Principles for the, Core and Use of Animals (Washington: American Psychological Association, 1971). A number of government and international codes also concern experimental activities; these include the HHS Institutional Review Hoards' regulations, the Nuremberg code and the Declaration of Helsinki.
2. Bylaws printed fn the American Psychological Association Directory (Washington: American Psychological Association, 1968), p. xii.
3. For instance, see the comments of nine distinguished psychologists in "Psychology and the Future," American Psychologist, 1978, 33, pp. 631-647.
4. N. Caplan, A. Morrison, and R, 1. Stambaugh. The Use of Social Science Knowledge in Policy Decisions at the National Level. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, Institute far Social Research, 1975).
5. P. Popper, P. Ebert-Flatteau, R. E. Love, and N. Marwell, "Survey of SPSSI members' public policy involvements," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, August, 1978.
6. T. Pettigrew, "Race, ethics and the social scientist," Hastings Center Report. 1979. 9, pp. 15-18; D. T. Lykken, "Uses and abuses of the polygraph," and E. S. Katkin, C. R. Fitzgerald, and D. Shapiro, "Clinical applications of biofeedback: Current status and future prospects," in H. L. Pick, Jr., H. W. Leibowitz, 1. E. Singer. A. Steinschneider, and H. W. Stevenson, (Eds.), Psychology From Research to Practice (New York. Plenum, 1978).
7. American Psychological Association, Ethical Standards of Psychologists. (Washington, American Psychological Association, 1977).
8. J. G. Morawski, The misuse of psychological knowledge in policy formulation: Three case studies. (Ottawa: Science Council of Canada, in press).